What is a Dybbuk/Dibuk? Are They Real?

[NOTE: I freely use multiple Anglicizations of dybbuk in this posting.  Makes it more searchable.  Please don't complain about it.]

An odd story has been circulating in the Jewish press about the possible appearance of a dibuk in Brazil.   You can read a summary of the stories HERE.

In conversations about the story, I am amazed at how many frum people dismiss the whole idea of dibbukim as "narishkeit" and fantastic superstition.   This has also been the tone of most of the comments and white-noise of the net.

What is lacking in this whole conversation is any Torah-based definition of what a dibuk actually is.

And so here are the basics:

I.  "The Dybbuk" vs. Real Dybbuk

     In 1920 the Elyseum Theatre of Warsaw premiered Solomon Anski's play The Dybbuk.  An overnight success, the play captured the imagination of Anski's fellow Yiddish authors, inspiring renewed literary interest in  the Jewish supernatural.  A spate of new spooky Yiddish tales were penned by several authors.   Most of these authors, like Anski himself, were not religious.  Their religion was that of the Bund, the movement of the secular Jewish socialists who sought  to redefine Judaism as a cultural/nationalist movement with Yiddish at its heart.

   Their tales of dybbukim, demons, and ghosts were fanciful, exaggerated,  and heavily stylized.  Needless to say, these tales were wildly popular, but in no way true to actual Jewish beliefs about the supernatural.   The oddest phenomenon of these tales is that they made their way back into the religious community and created an artificial mythology.  Not only were Yiddish tales of the supernatural adopted as normative belief , but also tales of Rebbes and Tzaddikim.  In fact, many of the "chassidishe stories" that we tell were originally the inventions of secular Yiddish Bundinsts that were later adopted by the frum community.   The tales of I. L. Peretz have, for some reason, been the favorites of this phenomena. 

    So, we really have two different dybbuks.  The first  is the romanticized dybbuk haunting the pages of Yiddish literature and the popular mythology it has engendered.  This dybbuk is the stuff of foolishness.  We don't believe in it.  Unfortunately, when most people think dybbuk, they are thinking of this fictional dybbuk.

   However, there is another dybbuk, one that originates in our holy writings and that is accepted by Chazal as part of HaShem's bria.  Unfortunately, this dybbuk is misunderstood and often confused with its fictional counterpart.   When most people criticize the idea of dybbuk, they are unknowingly criticizing the dybbuk of fiction, without realizing that there is a dybbuk that is very much a part of our religious reality.

II.  The Dybbuk in the Gemora

     The word dybbuk literally means "that which clings."  The technical definition of a dybbuk, therefore, is a soul that clings to a living person.

     While certain events in Tanakh can be read as evidence of posession by dibbukim (see the madness of Shaul, Shmuel I 18:10, and the prophet's warning to Achav, Melakhim I 22:21 and the meforshim there), there is no proof that such a reading is necessarily correct.  The major commentaries to these sections actually seem to veer away from dibbukim as an explaination of the recorded events.

     In canonical Torah literature the dibbuk first debuts exsplicitly in Eruvin 41b in a discussion about one who is removed from the techum (Shabbos boundary) against his will:

מי שהוציאוהו נכרים או רוח רע

"One who is taken out [of the techum] by heathens or an evil spirit..."

Rashi states that the case is one of an evil spirit that entered a person, disturbing his mental faculties to the point that he is no longer fully liable for his actions.  Other commentaries, though, understand that the Mishna  may refer to any sort of temporary insanity rather than possession.

The Mishna in Gittin is more explicit, though, discussing the case of one who tries to initiate a divorce while under the influence of the kurdyakos.  Gittin 67b tells us that the kurdyakos is a type of spiritual entity that could overpower a person.  The majority of the meforshim (including Rashi, Rav Ovadya Mi-Bartenura, the Tos. Yom Tov, Shiltei Gibborim, Ran, and Tos. ha-Rid) appear to understand this as possession by a malicious spirit.

While there are other passages in the Gemora that could be read as a referring to dibbukim, these two are the most explicit.  Yet, they are also problematic because they appear to discuss two different spiritual entities: the ruach ra, the "evil spirit," which is an ephemeral, somewhat generic term, and the kurdyakos, which is identified as a sheyd, a specific type of being.

A dibbuk is usually understood to be the soul of a deceased person that clings to a live one.   Neither of the Gemora's spirits is ever defined as the soul of a deceased person.  In this sense then, the Gemora's examples of possession seems to parallel the Christian concept of possession: that a malevolent or demonic spirit enters a human being and torments him.  So, where does the Jewish concept of dibuk come from?

III.   Kabbala and Dibbukim

The Zohar (Vayikra 70) clarifies things for us (now that's a statement you don't hear often!), teaching that the neshomos of reshoim become the evil spirits of this world.   This is to say that some of the spiritual entities the Gemora speaks of are, in fact, the souls of the deceased.

The mechanics by which dibukim function are explained primarily by the Zohar to Parshas Mishpatim, Rabbi Chaim Vital in his hakdomos to the Shaar ha-Gilgulim, and Rabbi Menasheh ben Yisroel in his Nishmas Chayim (NOTE - the Sefer Chezyonos attributed R' Vital is an oft quoted source on dibbukim, but the provenance of the sefer is doubtful and difficult, so I have avoided citing it here).  The important point here is that these discussions and conclusions about dibbukim are not based on superstition, folklore, or myth.  Rather, they are based on very detailed and scholarly analysis of the Tanakh, Mishna, Gemora, and Zohar's descriptions of the soul, divine judgment, and of G-d's overall structuring of the bria.   The dibbuk is a necessary part of this understanding.

IV.  Dibbukim in Brief

To summarize the hakdamos of Rabbi Chaim Vital, the Zohar to Parshas Mishpatim, Rabbi Menasheh ben Yisroel in his Nishmas Chayim, and the Sefer ha-Bris :

There are certain people who, upon their death, depart this world while their souls are in a "malfunctioning" state.  Sometimes, the soul may be reincarnated in order that it repair the flaw.   Sometimes this soul must undergo gehinnom for its purification.  Yet, some neshomos are not admitted either option.  These souls must return to the world, bodiless, to find their tikkun, their repair.  This bodiless return is something specific to that particular soul, something that neshoma needs.  Sometimes, that neshoma required the assistance of a talmid chochom/tzaddik to attain its perfection. 

Now, there are some living people who lust after certain sins with tremendous desire.  This lust can become pathological, contaminating the very soul and being of the individual.   A living soul can thus develop a pegima, an imperfection, that requires a tikkun as well.  When a person is a slave to this imperfection, he cannot free himself without the help of another.  After all, the Gemora tells us that a prisoner cannot free himself from his imprisonment - he must have assistance.

By dint of sharing the same flaw, the same desire, and requiring similar rectification, the disembodied soul and the living person unite for mutual benefit.  Having a body, the dybbuk, or clinging soul, can now attract the attention of one who can help it achieve its tikkun.  And this must be understood: "exorcism" of a dibbuk is a misnomer.   The removal of a dibbuk is the repair of the flaw of the dybbuk's soul.  When the soul has been assisted in its rectification, only then can it depart from the possessed.

This means that disembodied soul only becomes a dibbuk when attachment to the living will assist it in its tikkun.  If attachment will accomplish nothing, then the disembodied soul is not permitted to become a dibbuk.  Thus, dibbukim only happen when there is a talmid chocham in that generation who is capable of assisting it.   By the converse, if a Rabbi is unsuccessful in exorcising a dibbuk, this implies either that: A) The dibbuk is not a real dybuk, or B) That the wrong person is trying to "exorcise" it.

Possession benefits the possessed because, as the tzaddik/talmid chocham seeks to repair the dibbuk neshoma, he also assists the soul of the possessed in his own rectification.  So we see, again, that possession of the living is only permitted to the wandering neshoma if it is ultimately of benefit to both.

All in all, possession and the attendant "exorcism" exist as chasadim, as kindnesses, for the sake of both the living and the deceased.  

IV. Many Types of Dibbukim & Possession

What I have described above is the most extreme and rarest case of dibbukim.  Rabbi Chaim explains that there are many different types of dibbukim and they seek their rectification in different ways.  Most of these dibbukim never make themselves known or influence their hosts in any such way.   These silent dibbukim may come briefly and then depart.  Some may even be the souls of tzaddiim and actually benefit their hosts.  Others may be completely neutral.  All depends upon the situation of the disembodied soul and the person to whom it attaches itself.

However, a dibbuk only makes itself known if its appearance will benefit itself and the host.  Additionally, dibbukim must have permission from above in order to affect the living.

V.  Possession vs. Mental Illness

The 18th century Sefer ha-Bris, First Chelek 17:15 writes that the majority of supposed cases of possession are simply mental illness and that people are foolish to pre-suppose supernatural causes. Get a doctor, is the message of the Sefer ha-Bris.   Yet, the Sefer ha-Bris acknowledges that possession by a dybbuk is a real phenomena, albeit extremely rare.

There are specific simonim brought in the Sefer ha-Bris and other in the other sifrei mumchei kabbala as to what is and is not a real dibbuk.  Many of these simonim are supernatural and very hard to fake.  Nevertheless, as a precaution, these lists of simonim are always incomplete.  Certain signs are intentionally left out, transmitted only from teacher to student, so that people should not know how to falsify a dibbuk.

Among the signs of a valid dibbuk possession found in the Sefer ha-Bris, Shaar ha-Gilgulim, Iggres ha-Ramaz, and the Shalsheles ha-Kabbala are:

1.  A voice emanating from the person's body without any detectable motion of the lips, jaws, tongue, vocal chords, or other vocal apparati; 
2. The voice is thin, soft, high-pitched, and childlike;
3. The voice emanates from a particular organ or other place in the body besides the organs of speech;
4. Speaking fluently in languages that the possessed could not possibly know; 
5. Demonstrable clairvoyance.  For example: the ability to describe in real-time events happening at a distance away (remote viewing), impossible knowledge of past events (such as the sins or hidden deeds of others), being able to hold an object and determine its owner and history (psychometry); and,
   
6. The presence of an egg-sized, mobile,  sub-dermal mass on the person's body.  This mass also has the ability to move about the body upon request;
7.  If an apparent dibbuk manifestation can in anyway be explained naturally, then it is not a dibbuk.
   

These are only a sampling of validating factors for a dybbuk.   Absent any of these simonim, the possession is either trickery or mental illness.

There are at least four extremely well documented cases of dybbukim and exorcisms, not to mention numerous passing references in Torah literature.   In all of these accounts, there are consistent features that lead me to believe that there is a method and expertise to dealing with such things.

However, these accounts also make it clear that full-blown dibbuk manifestations are rare in the extreme, only capable of being handled by the greatest of tzaddikim and mekubalim, and that they only occur as a chesed for both the possessed and the possessing neshoma.

All this having been said, now it is time for my two cents:

Nireh li, and without intending this to be a criticism of any specific person, an unsuccessful exorcism proves that either 1) the exorcising rabbi isn't the right person to be handling the situation or the situation isn't a real dibbuk, and 2) anyone who really knows the purpose of dibbukim wouldn't/shouldn't allow the holy process of tikkun/exorcism to be turned into a circus.  Read that however you want.

Christianity & Judaism - Some Thoughts I

A lot of hackles have been raised recently by Rabbi Shlomo Riskin's remarks on Christianity and "Rabbi Jesus."  See HERE & HERE for more info.   For Rabbi Riskin's explanation of his remarks, see HERE.

My opinions on Christianity don't win me many non-Jewish friends and are probably a little extreme even by the standards of Orthodox Judaism.   Nevertheless, I have spent a lot of time in the past year contemplating Christianity.  I have come to realize that, via comparison to Judaism, I appreciate all the more so just how all encompassing, sensitive, and utterly human/humane Judaism is. 

Before getting into this further I need to lay it out on the table that I believe Chrisianity is an utterly senseless and false religion; the stinking refuse of Judaism.  Also, I don't spend time reading about Christianity.
I have only read about it when I had to in order to answer a question, or to understand something in the writings of chazal.  By no means does a Jew ever have any need to study this "stuff" for the sake of dialog or other such foolishness.   Islam, in the final analysis, holds more truth than Christianity.

Becuase I perceive utterly no value in it, I don't believe at all in interfaith dialoge between Jews and Christians.  We serve our G-d alone, as we always have.  All Jews need of Christians is to be left alone and free to practice our religion.  

That having been said, here are some thoughts I've been turning over in the past year.  At some point I will polish these up with some more sources and better editing.  As of now these are just raw ruminations...

I.  Personal Responsibility & Dehumanization

One of the unique features of Judaism is the utter and complete responsibility of the individual.   In Judaism, the individual is born into this world with two basic desires: the yetzer ha-ra (the desire to do evil) and the yetzer tov (desire to do good).  The former is essentially a self-destructive desire, while the latter coaxes us toward self-betterment.  Any decision that a person  makes in this world is the result of the tensions and battles between these two drives.  G-d has commanded us to fight this internal battle between our desires and to "choose good," to overcome the yetzer hora.   When an individual chooses to do evil, he has chosen the desires of the yetzer ha-ra.  When he does good, he has chosen the desires of the yetzer tov.

The point is that the entirety of the choice to do evil or good is man's own and he must battle himself and none other in the process of making that choice.  He owns his successes and failures and has none other to blame but himself.

Christianity, on the other hand, externalizes the human capacity for evil in the figure of Lucifer, or Satan; a sentient entity, neither a man nor a god, that temps man and thus leads him astray.  This Christian idea , that the drive of evil somehow exists "outside" the human being, is comforting.  It softens Judaism's hard edge of personal responsibility.  The externalization of evil is a theological "pat-on-the-back," a reassurance that, when one does evil, that "its not all your fault."

However, Christianity goes a step further by also externalizing good in the figure of J. Well, not completely.  The only good a person can accomplish on their own is the acceptance of J.  Besides this, no good is possible without him. Christianity therefore externalizes all human drives, good or bad, leaving the believer empty and divested of any responsibility, be it positive or negative.  The only choice or action that a person is truly on their own to make is the choice to follow J or not.

Therefore, the only thing that makes us human, according to Christianity, is the choice of J.  Every other aspect of human choice, responsibility, will, accountability or  existence is irrelevant.  The subtext of this bit of Christian theology is a de-facto dehumanization, a stripping away and divestment of man's responsibility and accountability for any action other than the choice of J.  Therefore, one who has not yet chosen J is liable only for his lack of choice.  Similarly, a person in such a state is also not accredited the accomplishment of good, since good is only  truly possible via choice in J.

Yet, once a believer has chosen J, they are still not truly liable for evil.  This is because all evil is either the result of the interference of Satan (for which one only need to repent by reaffirming belief in J), or because one is not capable of evil because of their connection to J.  The believer is still not capable of good either by fiat of having already chosen J, the "greatest good."  Any good the individual does is only an extension of J, and is not owned by the individual. 

This motif of dehumanization via divestment of responsibility has led to the most abhorrent cruelties perpetrated upon the non-believer: the inquisition, pogroms, etc.  The responsibility for such acts is, like good and evil itself, shifted outside the individuals and onto the figures of J or Satan.  Either these horrid events were mistakes engendered by the temptations of Satan, or auto de fe, "acts of faith."  In the internal life of the church, this dehumanization motif reappears as subtext in the concepts celibacy, transubstantiation, infallibility, and even in the figure of J himself.

Judaism, however, hinges the relationship with G-d, and who we are in G-d's eyes, by the everyday choices that we make and relationships that we build.  There is no one defining decision.   From the moment that we awaken, we are constantly confronting both our inner selves and G-d in every decision that we make.  Judaism embraces the humanity of the believer, warts and all, rejoicing when man chooses good, and mourning man's choices of evil.  Every human experience becomes part of the deepening and ever complex man-G-d relationship. 

Check Back Soon for Part II:  Divestment vs. Transformation:  Repentance vs. Teshuva...

Was Waiting for Something Like This to Come Up...

Erev Shabbos I was telling a guest that it was only a mater of time before this exact situation (see below) would happen and turn the current internet ban into a public charedi-chilloni fight in E"Y.  Of course, we will come out looking medieval and out-of-touch.   And, of course, some will argue that it is better to look out-of-touch than to put up with the tumah of the internet.  Fine- I get that argument.  It has a point.  

However, in the larger scheme of things, does such an argument really advance the koach and agenda of the Torah in this world?  Does that argument really help bring people closer to Torah?  Is this a public battle we really need/want to wage?

Secular Owner of Chareidi Site Threatens to Sue Rov Over Internet Ban

Tuesday January 5, 2010

 

Guy Cohen, CEO of Global Networks, the Internet media company whose Websites include the Bechadrei Charedim site, is threatening a million-shekel lawsuit against Rav Moshe Karp of Modi’in Ilit, who, behind-the-scenes, has led a three-week-old campaign against chareidi websites.

The campaign has already led to the closure of one major site, Hareidim, and the resignation of key figures from others. Cohen, a businessman who is not religious, is hoping to save Bechadrei.

On Motzoei Shabbos, Cohen met with Rav Karp and gave him a letter claiming that the rov under cover of the official boycott, was slandering him and engineering threats to the site’s advertisers. The letter informed Rav Karp that he could face NIS 1 million suit for slander.

The boycott began with a letter in the chareidi dailies signed by dozens of rabbonim.
The letter, which Rav Karp is thought to have written, targets not the estimated hundreds of thousands of users of the internet, but rather the operators of the chareidi sites.

“Recently, chareidi internet sites have been sending forth all sorts of reports and gossip and slander against the chareidi public…” the letter said in part.

Subsequently, both editors in chief of Bechadrei, Dovid Rotenberg and Dov Povarsky, announced they were leaving the site. One of the sites that continued operation, Kikar Hashabbos, is being attacked directly in the chareidi press. The ban generates headlines on a near-daily basis.

Bechadrei continues to operate, and Guy Cohen said recently that user numbers have not declined.
Cohen said he has, however, been hurt by the flight of advertisers from the site.

At a meeting last Motzoei Shabbos at Rav Karp’s Modi’in Ilit home, Cohen offered to submit the portal to the rabbonim’s authority, including increased supervision of forums by the direct representatives of the rabbonim. According to sources who attended the meeting, he was rebuffed. Rav Karp demanded that Cohen close the site, and that is when Cohen produced the letter informing Rav  Karp of his intention to sue.

{Yair Alpert-Matzav.com Israel}

Re-Post From a While Ago...

This is a re-post of something I put up over a year ago. In light of the most recent proclamations and kinuses regarding the internet (see HERE, HERE, and HERE...), I thought it was appropriate to revisit some of the questions that this approach raises...

A friend forwarded me this commercial a few months ago. After viewing it for the first time, I sat dumbfounded and open-mouthed for about 90 seconds. Was I supposed to be offended? Was I supposed to laugh? Should I write a letter to someone protesting this, a commercial whose entire gimmick revolves around people who look like me protesting?

For the next several days this advertisement haunted me. I couldn’t get it out of my head.

Now to shift gears. When I was learning in Israel I was an outsider with a party line. I was an American Yeshiva bochur supporting the charedi camp, yet not fully integrated into the complex web of politics/religion/power that is yiddishkeit in the medina. After a few months, I recognized that the clashes between religious and non-religious were not isolated events, but rather symptoms of a constant psychological tension churning just beneath the surface of “Israeli” society.

Because I was firmly in one of the categories (“charedi”) my objectivity was severely limited. Nevertheless, I wanted to understand the pathology of the conflict. If I understood the tensions, the fears of both sides, then perhaps I could use this understanding as a tool for kiruv. However, it was almost impossible to have an open discussion with anyone about the conflict. Both sides have deep issues with each other, yet they deal with the problems via a veil of intractable silence. It is like two brothers with long unsettled grudges who must now share a flat. They avoid the tough issues, dancing around them as a matter of practicality, until they can keep silent no longer. Then temperatures rise and things boil over. A few days later, they are back to status quo without having resolved anything.

In 2003 Noah Efron, a professor at Bar Ilan, published his book Real Jews. Secular academics are not usually the authors to whom I gravitate, but this book caught my interest. Real Jews is a pretty even-handed and frank (if not wholly unnerving) exploration of chareidi/chilloni tensions in Eretz Yisroel. What emerges from his account is much like my experience: the religious and secular worlds are separate universes wholly out of touch. However, each group believes that its understanding of the other is correct and resents the other based upon that belief.

Efron traces the current dynamic to some terrific political miscalculations in the early days of the medina. Assuming that the orthodox Jewish population would eventually dwindle and disappear, the early Zionist leaders granted charedim powers and concessions to garner their support in the creation of an essentially secular state. However, we haven’t disappeared. Over the past 6 decades, as we have grown, our relationship with secular Israeli society has become exceptionally convoluted. The result is a pathology of constant identity crisis/paranoia for both secular and religious Jews. This crisis is smeared across questions of national identity, religion, diet (kashrus), businesses (closed on Shabbos), and public transportation (Shabbos, separate seating on buses for men and women, etc).

Efron also addresses the secular perception of the charedi world as medieval, backward, and sinister. Although he touches upon it, I would have liked to have seen more about how the non-religious perceive charedi attitudes toward technology and scientific progress. Internally, we know that we are not technophobes. Nobody in the frum velt would assign himself such a label. We merely advocate responsible use of technology. Unfortunately, the rhetoric we employ is often misleading. I remember a shmuz from Yeshiva when one of my rebbeim spent 45 minutes blasting the microchip as a tool of the yetzer hora. All of the evils of today’s youth, he said, can be traced to electronics which have “distracted and drawn them away from the derech ho-emes.” What do all of these inventions have in common? The “maykro-tzip” which was “invented by atheists, by baboons in the shape of men who are devoid of wisdom and G-dliness.” He concluded that people should avoid their evil handiwork at all costs. As I left the shiur, I made a point of asking this Rabbi how he had been feeling since his bypass operation and pace-maker installation. He responded “it is k’mo nes [like a miracle].” Sigh.

This point now takes us back to the commercial. As I said, I couldn’t get it out of my head and finally realized why: it is simply brilliant advertising. Whoever created this ad has put their finger right on the nerve of… well… something.

For the past several years we have seen a “banning trend.” Banned cell phones, banned internet, banned computers, banned PDA’s, etc. Recently, a colleague in my community announced in his shabbos drosha that blogs were assur and banned. What emerges from these bans is an aura of technophobia. Regardless of whether or not we, the religious, are technophobes, such is the perception. And, as such, we are reinforcing one of the stereotypes which alienate us from the non-religious: that of the medieval, superstitious, backward shtetl dweller. In many ways, publicly banning new technologies does as much for our image in the eyes of the chillonim as would us explaining away electricity as magic or sorcery.

Now, for those of you who like to post comments without reading carefully or investing much critical thought, note this: I don’t disagree with most of these bans. My concern is that we have publicly over-invested our moral authority in issues that only alienate and contort our mission and ideals in the eyes of the non-religious.   [Indeed, this over-investment may have even exhausted the moral authority of many leaders even within our own community].  As a consequence, we are suffering from a sort of “moral inflation” to the point where proclamations of right and wrong from the religious Jewish world carry zero value amongst the non-religious. Perhaps we need to place our public zeal behind issues which carry more universal Jewish relevance: caring for our children, combating domestic violence, drug abuse issues, etc. In these areas we can be mekarev the non-religious. In these areas we can agree with them and show them the positive value that our hashkofos and way of life have to offer. Perhaps we should move away from negatively asserting our identity and instead focus on creating a positive identity. Jews are compared to letters in the sefer Torah. Yet, by defining our identity via negation it is as if we have poured ink onto klaf and are now scratching away the surrounding ink to create our letters. However, a sefer Torah written in this manner is posul on account of chok tochos. The letters must be written in a positive fashion to be kosher.

The commercial successfully taps into and provides a release for secular frustration with many of the issues describe by Efron. It also fires an arrow into perceived charedi technophobia. To the non-religious, our perceived opposition to technological innovation (or innovation as a whole) has become a routine, a song-and-dance. Hafganos have become choreographed, costumed displays of righteous fervor and histrionic sobbing (see the commercial at 35 seconds in) over issues which the secular public perceives as trivial. In deconstructing this video, we also see that there is a suspicion of insincerity. The zeal of the charedim is viewed as a front which may hide or compensate for something else in a sexually repressed culture (hence the use of the Village People’s YMCA as the soundtrack). All of these perceptions and paranoias are part and parcel of the non-religious fear of the charedi world.

And here, someone has tapped into these demons which lie beneath the surface and channeled that energy into selling HD-TV. Brilliant advertising.

The real punchline of all of this was the charedi reaction to the commercial: protest. In fact, so much protest that the commercial was eventually pulled. So, we protested a commercial criticizing our protesting. What is more, as an Israeli non-religious neighbor pointed out, secular Jews will ask: “How do charedim know about this commercial?” They will assume that someone in our world saw it on television. This assumption will only strengthen the suspicion of insincerity and hypocrisy. Perhaps righteous indignation was not the best instant response.

Just to reiterate: I don’t disagree with most of the bans or protests. Should TV in the home be opposed? Yes! Should we make people aware of the dangers of the internet? Yes! Should these issues be those in which we invest the bulk of our hislahavus and zeal? Should we define our Judaism in terms of protest and negation rather than positive assertions? Perhaps not.

Sichos ha-Ran (Rabbi Nachman's Wisdom): Commentary to Simon 2

I am currently writing a commentary to Rabbi Nachman of Breslov's Sichos ha-Ran, known is English as Rabbi Nachman's Wisdom.  See here for the text of Sichos ha-Ran online.  The Sefer is available here in English translation by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan from Breslov Research Institute. 

Once a week or so, I will post translations and excerpts from my commentary.  Please note that all of these postings are of copyrighted materials.  Please ascribe attribution where appropriate. 


Bais Avraham to Simon 2-

In the preceding simon, the Rebbe taught that Daas Dovid, a limited, intuitive, private experience of G-d's greatness, can only be attained in whatever degree possible by emunah, faith in G-d.  Intellectual investigation or philosophical analysis can only bring one to, at best, Da'as Yisro, a knowledge of facts about G-d. While Da'as Yisro can have benefits, reliance on philosophical investigations of religion can be dangerous and misleading (as we will discuss in simon 5).

I should have mentioned this in the post to simon #1-  There is significant debate among the Rishonim as to which is the superior path to attain "knowledge" of G-d. The Kuzari 2:26, Shiltei Gibborim to Avoda Zara 5b (in the Rif), Akeidas Yitzchok., Zohar 2:25a, Sefer Chareidim 1, Sefer Chassidim, 14,  and others maintain that the superior understanding and closeness to G-d is proved and attained via our mesora and service of G-d alone.

However, others hold that this method of understanding HaShem is only the introductory level, while the ultimate level is the product of intellectual/philosophical contemplation of G-d.  This is the way of the Sefer Mitzvos Gadol (Pos. 2), the Chovos ha-Levavos I:3, amd of course, the Moreh Nevuchim 3:51.

Rabbi Nachman of Breslov is obviously of the former school of thought - that understanding of G-d through philosophical/intellectual analysis ( Daas Yisro) is inferior to knowledge of G-d attained through mesora, faith, and service (Da'as Dovid).  

As an aside - I think that the question of which path is superior is deeply tied into the story of Yisro.   Yisro was a ba'al Avoda Zara, someone incredibly far from true knowledge of G-d.   Yet, knowing certain facts about G-d was enough to bring him to an exclusive relationship with HaShem.  One could argue that intellectual knowledge about G-d is greater because it was even able to bring someone as far away as Yisro to HaShem.  

On the other hand, one could also argue that intellectual knowledge was only enough to push Yisro across the threshold, while movement beyond that initiation into G-dly knowledge required a more intensive relationship based on emunah.  Perhaps this is alluded to by Yisro's statement: Now I know that HaShem is greater than all the gods, for in the matter which they had conspired against them...!  Yisro begins with a statement of intellectual proof as to G-d's greatness, yet apparently leaves off in mid-sentence.  It is as if, having entered the gates of emunah, he is immediately left speechless- Yisro attains Da'as Dovid, the level beyond words or proof.

In simon 2, the Rebbe answers the question that flows naturally from the first simon: How does one "do" emunah?  Emunah is apparently an internal device, not something that can be mechanically "siwtched on."  In this sense, emunah is similar to an emotion.  If this is the so, then how does one come to engage in and grow his emunah?    

The Rebbe is telling us that the first step is letting go of everything over which we believe we have control and surrendering it to G-d.  Not only are we to do this with our conerns and worries, but even our very movements and the details of our religious observances.  

The Rebbe appears to be going so far as to even require us to surrender our free will to HaShem.  Is Rabbeinu really asking us to do that? Not quite.  In simon 238, the Rebbe clarifies this advice: "Ve-saknenu be-eitza tova mil'fanecho... This is a most precious prayer.  You must always beg that G-d have mercy and give us good advice and guidance so that we may be worthy of knowing what is right.  If you want to serve G-d, then you must understand this well.  Plead before G-d and ask that you be worthy of His good council... When the day begins, I surrender my every movement to G-d.  I ask that every motion that I may make be according to his will..."

What the Rebbe is telling us is that, while surrendering one's material cares and worries to HaShem is sine qua non for any religious person, being a religious Jew requires even further surrender.  For a Jew, religious life is far more than merely seven days of work and one-day-per-week of prayer, as it is for the goyim.   For a religous Jew, the material concerns of life are bound up at every moment with myriads of religious requirements and mitzvos both in the human realm (bein adam le-chaveiro) and in the G-dly (bein adam le-Makom).

To understand exactly what HaShem wants from us at every given moment takes tremendous wisdom and divine assistance - the eitzos discussed by the Rebbe in Simon 238.  All of our great poskim have testified that their success in rendering decisions derives from a combination of scholarship and divine assistance.  Furthermore, if you ask them to explain their success in scholarship, they will testify that it was impossible without some sort of assistance. 

Even in our Avodas ha-Shem, we must have guidance and assistance from above to succeed.

How does G-d assist us in these areas?  G-d assists us by sending us "eitzos," the wisdom to recognize His will when we are often in doubt and uncertain. 

However, a person must pray for this wisdom and assitance and that we always be able to make the correct choice. 

Now, while the Rebbe tells us to place all of our concerns upon HaShem, this does not excuse us from our requirement to do "histadlus," to do our part. We must study Torah because this is a mitzva.  We must work to earn a living because of the chet of Adam ha-Rishon.  Nevertheless, the outcome of all of our efforts is ultimately in the hands of HaShem.  

We must daven that HaShem guide us along the way, enlighten our eyes as to His will, and guide us to do that which is right in His eyes. 


While a Jew must pray that G-d will sustain him in all of his material wants according to both his needs and merits, we must also believe that G-d will assist us even in our areas of religious obligation and service.

Shailo - Permissibility of Public Menorah Lightings?

Shailo:

Dear Rabbi Bloomenstiel,

 How does [the halacha] apply lighting giant, public Chanukias in Israel and elsewhere.  I have often imagined building a relatively gigantic Chanukia out of 55 gallon drums, steel beams and columns and placing it on the highest hill in Texas.  There are no “front doors” near the site.  Does the absence of proximal “front doors” make lighting it out of doors okay? - Yitzchok

Tshuva:

I have already written an extensive teshuva on the permissibility of public menorah lightings that will appear in the first volume of my Sefer Shailos u-Teshuvos.  In short, the Sages of the Talmud decreed that one only fulfills his mitzvah of lighting the Channukia, ideally, by either lighting immediately outside or inside the doorway, opposite the mezuzah, and within 3 to 10 tefachim of the ground.  In situations where this is not possible, the sages allowed for other ways of fulfilling the mitzvah.   However, a public menora lighting that is not tied to ish u-beiso, to a particular person or his household, does not fulfill any mitzvah.  

Therefore, one cannot fulfill his obligation of lighting the chanukah lights with a public menorah lighting.  Furthermore, a bracho cannot be recited on a public menorah lightings because we only recite the blessing on the actual performance of a mitzvah and no mitzvah is performed here.  

One may ask, however, how it is that we light the menorah with a blessing in shul between minchah and maariv ( see OC 671:7)?  After all, this lighting is not performed in the manner prescribed by Chazal!  The Rivash in his Teshuvos 111 explains that this lighting cannot fulfill anyone's obligation and does not constitute a mitzvah.  Rather it is only a custom.  

However, if it is only a custom, then how is it that we can make a blessing on it?  The answer is that, according to Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafos Brachos 14 (see also Taanis 28a, Succos 44b, and Arachin 10)  there are circumstances in which we do make brachos on certain types of minhagim.  For example, Ashkenazim make a bracho on the recitation of Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, even though such a recitation is only a custom (see Taanis 28).  This issue of brachos-on-minhagim is extremely complex, and is dealt with at length in my full teshuva.

Numerous poskim (Tzitz Eliezer, Shevet ha-Levi, Az Nidberu, Minchos Yitzchok, and Rav Moshe Shternbuch) have all explained that the license to recite a blessing on the lighting of the menorah in shul is restricted solely to lighting in shul, and is not extended to any other public lighting of the menorah.  

Regarding the fact that the public lightings we're discussing take place outside: Rav Shternbuch's opposition to outdoor lightings  discussed in a previous post is only relevant to lighting done for the sake of the mitzvah.  Since there is no mitzvah accomplished with these public lightings, then there is no reason to oppose it based on the fact that it takes place outdoors.

Conclusion:  The Az Nidberu 6:75 finds merit in the practice of public menorah lightings, and the custom has never been seriously opposed by the poskim.   So, it seems to me that  public menorah lighting is permitted as long as there is no risk that the menorah or persons lighting it would come to any potential danger.  However, it is prohibited to make any blessing upon this lighting.  Furthermore, one must still light in his home according to the decree of the sages.  

From CTC-Torah.org

One of my biggest projects is a Sefer Torah that I am writing for congregation Toras Chaim of Dallas, TX.  The Rav of the Shul, R' Yaakov Rich, has set up an excellent website (www.CTC-Torah.org) to track the progress of the project and assist in raising funds.


This is the most recent post from the blog.  Please stop over to www.CTC-Torah.org and check us out!

Dots n’ Drush…

While we do not place vowel markings in a Torah scroll, there is a tradition to place dots over the letters of certain words in ten verses:

• Bereishis (Genesis) – 16:5; 18:9; 19:33; 33:4; 37:12.

• Bamidbar (Numbers) – 3:39; 9:10; 21:30; 29:15;

• Devarim (Deuteronomy) – 29:28

What is the purpose of these dots?
The Talmud Yerushalmi, Pesachim, 9:2 explains as follows:

“The Sages say, when there are more undotted letters than dotted letters, expound upon the undotted letters and don’t read the dotted letters, and when there are more dotted letters than undotted letters, expound the dots and don’t read the letters. Rabbi says, even when there is only one dot above them, expound the dot and don’t read the letters.”

The Medrash in Bereshit Rabba 48:16  and  Rashi to Bereshis 18:9 both quote the rule of the Yerushalmi, writing: “Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says, any place you find more  undotted letters than dotted ones, you expound the undotted letters; more dots than letters, you expound the dots.”

In other words, certain pesukim contain layers of meaning that are revealed by alternate, homiletical reading of certain words.  These alternative readings are indicated by our helpful friend: the Dot.

For example, in this section of the Torah, the three visiting angels who arrive at the tent of Avraham address their host: “…Vayomru eilav ayeh sarah…”  They inquired of him: ‘Where is Sarah…?”

In this passage, the word eilav, of him, has dots over the letters Alef, Yud, and Vov.   The letter Lamed is the only letter not dotted.  Based upon the aforementioned rules of interpreting dots, we can read the word eilav as if the Lamed is not present.  Read as such, the passage is: “… Vayomru ayo…” They said: Where is he?
Rashi interprets: not only did the angels ask Abraham, “Where is Sarah?” but they also asked Sarah, “Where is he; where is Avraham?”  For us, this teaches that one should always inquire of a man as to the welfare of his wife and of a woman as to the welfare of her husband.

There are other deeper, mystical interpretations of this reading, Where is he?,  in addition to Rashi’s interpretation, that reveal even further layers of meaning.

Now, you may have noticed that my dots over the word eilav in the above photo are shaped like small diamonds.   This was purely unintentional; the mere product of the placement of quill upon parchment.
The Kesses ha-Sofer 16:4 writes that there is no particular shape for the dots, only that they cannot resemble any of the the Hebrew letters – i.e. yud.

Check back tomorrow for pictures of columns 16 & 17!

Rare Television Interview with Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan z"l

In 1979 Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan appeared on a WNBC program entitled The First Estate: Religion in Review, which was a series of interviews with various religious firgures conducted by Dr. Russel Barber.

Part I

Part II

Somehow, Rabbi Kaplan was interviewed as a "spokesperson" for Jewish mysticism.   It is an interesting interview, and Dr. Barber asks some tricky questions,  in particular about practical Kabbala vs. the definition of kishuf. 

Enjoy!

Beis Avraham - More Than Just a Blog...

Prior to the economic collapse of last year, I was either the director or rabbinic adviser for a number of philanthropic organizations, including Jews for Judaism of Jerusalem.  Primarily, I worked in three areas:

•     Coordinating and funding re-vitalization programs for struggling Orthodox shuls (basically, keeping frum shuls frum).   This was the biggest of the three and involved providing financial planning services, funding to employ full-time Rabbis, Jewish education programs, and legal services to shuls that have run into trouble.  We successfully saved 4 frum shuls from the brink of losing their buildings or becoming non-frum.

•    Providing mezuzos, tefillin, taleisim, tzitzis, and new cookery/utensils to needy newly observant families at either low or no-cost.

•    Providing grants and securing funding for the publication of new works of Torah scholarship by promising American talmidei chachomim.  The publication of seforim in America is suffering due to the cost and hard financial realities of the Torah publishing world. 

When the economy went sour, a number of these organizations either folded or severely restricted their charitable activities in these three areas.  Nevertheless, I took it upon myself to find funding for and continue these projects.  At times I have dug deeply, very much so,  into my own pockets to continue this important work.

I am currently applying for 501(c)3 designation for Bais Avraham so that I can continue these projects.

  Please consider donating to Bais Avraham using the Donate button to the right of your screen.   Your support is GREATLY appreciated.

Thanks -

Rabbi Avraham Bloomenstiel

Rav Yitchok Bernstein ztz"l on Parshas Toldos

Click here for Rav Y. Bernstein on Parshas Toldos


(The first few seconds are cut off - sorry!)


For at least 10 years now I have been a big fan of Rav Bernstein's shiurim.   In general I have trouble listening to recorded shiurim/lectures.  However, I find Rav Bernstein hypnotic.  The depth of his analysis and polished presentation are a real treat. 

A native of Dublin, Ireland, Rav Bernstein was one of the outstanding talmidim of the Gateshead Yeshiva.  In his pulpit career Rabbi Bernstein was associated with four congregations: Terenure Congregation, Dublin (1967-71), Hampstead Garden Suburb, London (1972-77), Jewish Center, New York (1977-81), and Finchley, London from 1981 until his death. The Rav was niftar in 1994 at the far-too-young age of 54.

The recording quality may not be the best, but the Torah is excellent.

You can hear more of him at 613.org.